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GROWING A CONSTITUTION
A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION. William N. Eskridge, Jr.1 and John Ferejohn.2
New Haven: Yale University Press. 2010. Pp. viii + 582.
$85.00 (Cloth).
Leslie Gielow Jacobs

3

According to the “romantic” tale of constitutional change
(pp. 4, 34), our written Constitution created oh, so many years
ago, establishes our most important and fundamental rights.
Although we all agreed (by proxy) to these commitments
originally, the majorities that inhabit the unruly political
processes have a nasty tendency to go astray, and implement
oppressive practices. In this case, it is up to the Justices, who
reside up on high, to gallop in to save the day, interpreting real
life meaning into the written words and casting aside injustices.
But the Camelot of the Warren Court is no more. The Justices
are acting more like anointed monarchs than white knights,
refusing to engraft expanded rights for the disempowered onto
the Constitution’s bare bones text, or worse—and increasingly
frequently of late—reaching out under cover of its broadly
worded provisions to invalidate specific and significant judgments about distribution of private rights and use of public
power reached, refined and embraced by democratic majorities
across temporal and geographic boundaries and in spite of
apparent ideological divides. Much of the legal academy has
been wringing its collective hands for years now. Things have
reached such a state that big thinkers such as Dean Larry
Kramer and Professor Mark Tushnet have predicted the loss of
“We the People” popular sovereignty, and called for stripping
4
constitutional review power from the Court, respectively. In
1. John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale University.
2. Charles Seligson Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
3. Professor of Law and Director, Capital Center for Public Law & Policy,
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
4. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
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their new book, A Republic of Statutes, William N. Eskridge, Jr.
and John Ferejohn add to this lively conversation of how
constitutional change does and should occur. Although they
characterize their theory of constitutionalism as “radical” (p. 26),
in actuality they counsel a less dramatic response to the pesky
problem of activist review by unelected judges: Don’t pay so
much attention, and maybe they’ll stop acting out.
I
Eskridge and Ferejohn present a “nontraditional framework for thinking about American constitutionalism” (p. 1). In
the traditional framework, the Constitution is great, judges are
good, and the actors in the political process are the shifty and
unprincipled bad guys, who must constantly be monitored lest
they misbehave. By contrast, the Eskridge/Ferejohn framework
puts the democratic process and the political actors who operate
within it front-and-center in their explanation of how the really
important rights and liberties that impact and improve the lives
of real people today get made. While traditionalists avert their
gaze from interest groups, politicians, administrative bureaucrats
and the haphazard, cobbled-together products that they tend to
create, the book’s authors stare with undisguised relish. For
Eskridge and Ferejohn, the hurly burly, nitty gritty, back-andforth of day-to-day politics is something to celebrate. In the
authors’ small-“c” constitutionalism, the products of the political
process—statutes, regulations, treaties—are the key texts;
legislators, executive officials and legislators, the government
actors with the primary power to establish what the words mean;
and judges, the ones who must be watched most carefully lest
they fail to recognize the fundamentality and legitimacy of the
norms that We the People make, as we act alone, or in combinations, through our elected representatives, and in a host of
other messy but meaningful kinds of ways.
The authors present the specifics of their theory in the first
part of the book through a string of trilogies, which multiply and
repeat with the insistency of a Power Point slide show.
Democratic constitutionalism requires (1) “popular choice of
political leaders,” (2) a “normative hierarchy embodying substantive rights,” and (3) “institutions and procedures for
enforcing the hierarchy and at least some of the rights” (p. 2).
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2005); MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000).
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Our written Constitution, augmented by the Bill of Rights,
accomplished these things. But the words are vague, and the
dramatically difficult Article V amendment process means that
the primary vehicle for constitutional change cannot be
deliberation and decision by We the People, through our many
and diverse elected representatives. Instead, constitutional
updating must be accomplished through interpretation and
pronouncement by unelected judges.
Three problems plague our judge-enforced big-“C”
Constitution. First, the Justices are not institutionally situated to
duplicate the legitimacy of the impractical constitutional
amendment process, the accuracy or wisdom of the judgment
reached, or effective enforcement of the result. Second, the
norms of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Court, do not
apply directly to private action. Because of their limited
application, judge-interpreted constitutional rights cannot
change the behaviors that most harm the disadvantaged or
penetrate deeply into popular culture to change hearts and
minds. Third, the Constitution’s scant text does not obviously
impose duties on governments to create and guarantee the
conditions that allow all of the nation’s citizens, whatever their
particular characteristics or circumstances, to live productive and
fulfilling lives (pp. 4–5).
These three “huge limitations” of big-“C” Constitutionalism
have channeled the American people toward the small-“c”
constitutionalism of defining and refining rights and liberties
through legislative and administrative actions. In the “republic
of statutes” that the authors describe, new, and potentially
positive, rights commitments are made through the political
process. They may be fleeting or, according to the small-“c”
constitutional process, they may achieve “super” status, which
means that, like big-“C” Constitutional norms, they are more
fundamental and enduring than ordinary law.
The authors advance three themes about the interaction of
small-“c” “super” constitutional products of the democratic
processes with big-“C” Constitutional norms (pp. 6–24). First,
political process products transform Constitutional baselines
(pp. 6–7). Eskridge and Ferejohn distinguish the terse big “C”
Constitution from the voluminous and dense products of the
political process—statutes, regulations, treaties and executive
orders—that together form the “working constitution,” which
primarily structures how we live, interact and achieve our life
possibilities these days. They argue that these products not only
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fill in the gaps in a document that provides few specifics relevant
to today, but that they are created through a governance process
that transcends that which the Constitution created. Specifically,
agencies now regulate much of what we do day-to-day.
Additionally, state law still structures many of the basic ground
rules of core institutions, such the market and family. In these
many ways, political actors and the products they create, not
judges interpreting Constitutional rights, define and refine core
norms of public morality. The authors argue further, pointing to
the example of the desegregation obligations imposed by the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, that norms created by statute may
influence the public’s perception of the scope of Constitutional
rights, may improve the actual material enjoyment by litigants of
their adjudicated Constitutional rights and may also impact the
Court’s subsequent interpretations of those same Constitutional
rights.
The authors’ second theme is that structures and norms
created through the ordinary political processes may become
“entrenched” so that they operate with a force akin to big-“C”
Constitutional norms (pp. 7–8). Here, the authors refer to the
distinction drawn in Max Weber’s theory of power, between that
which is based on the authority to command and that which is
based on the force of social norms. They claim that laws typically
operate within both of these spheres. They acknowledge that
big-“C” Constitutional norms have greater authority to
command, because, according to the text of the Supremacy
Clause, they trump small-“c” constitutional norms. They argue,
however, that some norms created through the political process
acquire “super” power within the social sphere, which means
that they are more resistant to change than ordinary products of
the political process and able to exert force to influence behavior
beyond their formal legal boundaries.
And the authors press their point further. In this republic of
statutes, which they assert that this nation has become, the
political process is not only another route through which
fundamental norms become identified and adopted by the polity,
it is the only way that really works these days (p. 14). The
political process works better than constitutional amendment or
judicial pronouncement at establishing and entrenching public
norms because it presents the possibility for republican
deliberation. The authors set out another three-factor test to
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identify the type of deliberation they mean, but, most basically
what they are talking about are legal norms that have emerged
after the back-and-forth of active engagement with them by
6
many political actors over the course of time. Three types of
sub-constitutional law have the potential to undergo the
republican deliberation necessary to achieve “super” status.
These are (1) state statutory convergences, (2) “ambitious”
federal statutes, and (3) transnational agreements and
conventions (p. 16).
With respect to federal statutes in particular, enactment in
response to popular demand is only the beginning. The process
of entrenchment through implementation is crucial to tapping
into the deeper, social norm source of power. The entrenchment
process usually involves a three-step process. First, the statute’s
supporters and its administrators must figure out how to
implement it effectively, creating evidence that progress has
been made. Second, application of the statute must avoid the
disasters predicted by opponents, and, better yet, produce gains
that win them over. Third, implementation of the statute must
expand its constituency. After a subsequent Congress reaffirms
what the first one did, modifying the norm or its applications as
appropriate in light of the lessons learned through administration, an emerging superstatute comes of age. According to
Eskridge and Ferejohn, the small-“c” “constitutional” process of
superstatute norm entrenchment is superior to that which can be
achieved through the big-“C” process of Constitutional change
for three (yes, three) reasons. Superstatute entrenchment is
“institutional, but without the rigid supermajority requirements
imposed by Article V;” it is “deliberative, but with the process
focused on agencies and legislatures rather than courts;” and it is
“popular, but with feedback occurring over time” rather than in
one big Constitutional showdown (p. 17).
With their third claim, Eskridge and Ferejohn describe what
they see as the “productive role” unelected judges can continue
to occupy in this brave new republic of statutes that they identify
(p. 22). It is “modest,” to be sure, but provides a “conceptual
payoff” nevertheless (p. 434). According to their theory of small“c” constitutionalism, deliberation in the democratic process,
5. Republican deliberation must be purposive, dialogic, and accountable to
stakeholders (p. 15).
6. The authors describe the political process as the “gradual process of legislation,
administrative implementation, public feedback, and legislative reaffirmation and
elaboration” (p. 14).
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over the course of time and in numerous venues is what
identifies new fundamental norms and cements them, and so the
authors argue that the Court should look to this deliberation to
guide its big-“C” Constitutional interpretations. Indeed, they say
it is “high time” other legal theorists saw things this way, too (p.
435). The authors counsel that judicial review should above all
be deliberation-respecting, which means the state and national
deliberative processes should have “significant normative force”
when judges evaluate the constitutionality of its products (laws
and policies) and where those processes have occurred, the
7
Court generally should defer. As compared to original meaning
theories of interpretation, Eskridge and Ferejohn argue that
their deliberation-respecting theory provides a more objective
and democratically responsive method for judges to apply
ambiguous Constitutional text to modern problems. They argue
that judges ought to treat norms that have achieved “super”
status as precedents, to be studied and presumptively applied to
interpret ambiguous Constitutional text (pp. 444–55).
The three parts of the book, each divided into three
chapters, present detailed “case”—or, rather, “statute”—studies
through which the authors illustrate, explain and defend their
themes. In Part I, the authors present their theory of small-“c”
8
constitutionalism. They present the history of three major
statutes, which they argue have achieved the “super” status.
These are the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, and the Sherman Act of 1890. The authors
use these examples to illustrate “norm entrepreneurship” by
legislative and executive officials (as opposed to judges), the
legitimating deliberation that occurs over time and at many
locations in the political process, and the power of superstatute
norms to curve legal and social space-time so that they impact
behaviors beyond their formal legal commands.
The chapters in Part II address the process of small-“c”
constitutional entrenchment. The examples include the Social
Security Act of 1935, state statutory convergences in the areas of
marriage and family, and the “green constitution” as embodied

7. When Congress has failed to deliberate appropriately, judicial review should be
deliberation-inducing, which means the Court uses a “soft” means of rebuke, such as
statutory interpretation, to send the issue back for the deliberation that was supposed to
have occurred (p. 24).
8. They also call this process “administrative constitutionalism,” with the
explanation that the more accurate label of “congressional-presidential-administrative
constitutionalism” would be too long (p. 26).
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in the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act. The
authors present pages and pages of bills, laws, amendments,
regulations, and political gains and setbacks to defend their
claim that through this arduous, and often tedious, process,
institutions and norms established by statutes and regulations
achieve a durability that is analogous to the “entrenchment” that
the written text of the Constitution and judicial interpretations
of it enjoy. Importantly, Eskridge and Ferejohn acknowledge
that some features of the written Constitution, like its
bicameralism requirement for enactment of legislation, are
entrenched more deeply than norms created through the
political process can ever be. They claim, however, that the
“super” norms that emerge from the political process gauntlet
that they describe are more entrenched than ordinary legislation
and a number of judicially interpreted Constitutional rights (p.
165). In the chapter about the environmental statutes, in
particular, the authors make a number of points about judicial
review of agency action. Most basically, they argue that agency
interpretation of federal superstatutes will inevitably be
dynamic, and the Court should most often let it happen, so long
9
as it is evident that deliberation occurred. In fact, and
“[r]eflecting current practice,” the Court should “openly
announce deliberation as a plus factor in judicial review” (p.
265).
Part III presents examples to illustrate small-“c”
constitutionalism’s “great virtue” of adaptability. These
examples are the various laws establishing rules relating to
money and banking, homosexuality and national security. The
authors label this part as presenting cycles of constitutional
entrenchment and dis-entrenchment. With respect to the first
two examples, they present histories to demonstrate successful
dis-entrenchment of an entrenched small-“c” constitutional
norm (the United States Banks and the “anti-homosexual
constitution,” respectively). With respect to national security,
they argue that the Bush-Cheney innovations relating to
wiretapping and waterboarding were attempted disentrenchments that did not stick. Although they promote small“c” constitutionalism as better than its big-“C” alternative, in
9. Specifically, the authors argue that “the best role for judicial review to play in
the modern administrative state is to be deliberation-inducing as to normative agency
judgments.” This means that the Court should defer when an agency has engaged in
“model deliberation,” and not defer when an agency’s interpretation “comes out of
nowhere,” or otherwise suggests that the agency did not fully consider its result (p. 265).
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this part they acknowledge that administrators charged with
developing “super” norms can “go[] off track.” (p. 305). In these
chapters, they provide examples of administrators’ missteps, and
identify potential checks. Although all three branches possess
the power to impose limits on renegade agency action, Eskridge
and Ferejohn identify the judiciary as “exceedingly important”
in this respect, identifying limits set by state and federal judges
on aggressive anti-homosexual policies and on “the administrative culture of torture” as good deeds done (pp. 307–08).
II
The Republic of Statutes is a big book, which adds value at a
number of levels to the discussion of how the most fundamental
commitments that inhabit our laws become made and evolve.
One is as history, and it is this that is most difficult to present in
a summary. The information jam-packed into the book’s many
chapters—the ideas, the personalities, the connections that the
authors make among activities happening at different times and
in different places—is fresh and interesting. It does not hurt, of
course, that the examples recount histories that readers have
lived through, perhaps participated in, and that sprinkled
through the text are names of people readers are likely to have
met or know. But that the book is relevant is hardly a criticism.
Not everyone is going to agree with the claims the authors make
about small-“c” constitutionalism and its authority to rival big“C” Constitutional norms in life and law. But all readers are
going to learn something, and be provoked to reconcile their
own assumptions about how “fundamental” law is formed with
the very plausible claims that Eskridge and Ferejohn make.
The book is also inspiring. These authors make heroes out
of career politicians and bureaucrats. How unexpected is that?
Although its story of change through the courts is their
antithesis, many of the book’s separate stories evoke a feel-good
10
Road to Brown glow. The authors personalize their accounts
from the get-go by introducing real people, with names and life
circumstances, who need the law changed. They then present
more real people—private activists, legislators, administrators—
who took action to get the job done. Their focus is not on
corruption, capture, partisanship, and road blocks (although they
10. THE ROAD TO BROWN (University of Virginia 1989) (depicting the work of
Charles Hamilton Huston and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund that led to the decision
in Brown v. Board of Education).
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mention these things). They think government is good and the
lawmaking process, by and large, works. The accounts are not all
happy talk, but the authors’ overall theme of incremental change
achieved through hard work and persistence applied through the
established structures of governance is on the rosy side of the
spectrum of opinions likely to be offered these days.
Eskridge and Ferejohn are going to lose some readers when
they talk about entrenchment. It is a tricky term to use to
describe products of the ordinary democratic process when it is
the quality that usually distinguishes more fundamental
“Constitutional” law from those things. The fact is that
“entrenched” means “more difficult to change than ordinary
law,” and even the most super of superstatutes can be modified
or repealed by the same processes (set out in Article I) as the
lowliest of laws. The authors explain that they mean social, not
formal, legal, entrenchment. The question then becomes: what is
important about that?
In arguing that the social entrenchment of fundamental
norms is highly important, the authors succeed to the extent
their ambitions are descriptive. It seems obvious that, given the
few words in the Constitution, many of the important norms that
structure how people live and interact day-to-day will appear in
statutes, and in regulations that refine them. It is not much of a
stretch to go further along with the authors to acknowledge that,
with respect to many of these norms, a majority of active voters
will grow accustomed to them, embrace them as appropriate (for
a variety of reasons), and not seek to change them significantly.
It also seems likely that these new norms will influence
behaviors outside their formal legal ambit, causing unregulated
people to conform their conduct out of social pressure, spawning
new laws that build on the new norm, or influencing how judges
choose to interpret big-“C” Constitutional provisions. This chain
of events that defines small-“c” constitutionalism is interesting
and adds to the understanding of the role of statutes and
products of the political process more generally in influencing
the creation and evolution of fundamental norms.
The authors’ claim that judges, and the Justices in
particular, should identify entrenched norms embodied in
“super” products of the democratic process and use them to
guide their constitutional decision making, is a tougher sell. It is
one thing to look backwards and to claim that some products of
the democratic process have established “super” norms, which
have had the outside-their-formal-legal-boundaries influences
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that the authors claim. It is another, and much more difficult
thing to claim that these “super” norms can be identified—
objectively—and applied to modern problems as both the norms
and the problems are evolving.
Reasonable people are going to disagree about what
amount of time passage or back-and-forth deliberation makes a
statute “super” and what the level of generality of reading the
norm should be. As to the latter point, the authors argue that
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in District of Columbia v.
11
Heller, purporting to rely on “original meaning” to interpret the
Second Amendment to guarantee a limited right to possess hand
guns in the home, could more legitimately have justified its
result based on state and federal laws that regulated guns
generally, but consistently failed to restrict gun possession for
hunting or self-defense (pp. 438–42). So now it is super-silence
we are talking about? To be fair, the authors’ evidence of how
their theory of judicial review is superior to the variations
offered by originalists is much richer than can be presented here,
and they offer their theory as a better justification for a result
that they do not embrace. Nevertheless, the gymnastics required
to explain the application of their theory in this example
undermine their claim that an objective and predictable method
exists to identify “super” norms.
Reasonable people will also disagree about the
circumstances under which a “super” state law convergence
should be interpreted to occur. The authors argue that the
12
Court’s unanimous decision in Loving v. Virginia was a correct
application of small-“c” constitutionalism, because “all but
sixteen states” had repealed their miscegenation laws (and these
were largely in the South) (p. 448). As another example, they
13
argue that both the decisions in Bowers v. Hardwick and
14
Lawrence v. Texas were appropriate because in 1986 (Bowers)
twenty-four states still criminalized sodomy (p. 363), whereas in
2003, that number had dropped to fifteen (p. 368). Huh? Again,
the authors offer detailed evidence that cannot be presented
here to support their claims. They point to changes in “public

11. 554 U.S. 570 passim (2008).
12. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that miscegenation statutes violate the Due
Process Clause).
13. 478 U.S. 186, 198 (1986) (holding that a state anti-sodomy statute does not
violate fundamental rights).
14. 539 U.S. 558, 587 (2003) (overruling Bowers and holding that a state antisodomy statute did violate fundamental rights).
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opinion” and in other democratic process arenas, and seem to
rely as well upon momentum to support their determination that
a “super” state law convergence has occurred. But if change is
happening, it would seem that the democratic processes are
working, which is what the authors prefer. Absent dramatic and
systemic blockages impeding fair deliberation in the political
process (which is what the authors find to be the “best defense”
of the Court’s aggressive norm pronouncement in Brown v.
15
Board of Education (p. 456)), deliberation-respecting review
would seem to require that the Court defer. At the very least,
the tipping point for state statutory convergences is not obvious.
Unfortunately, but predictably, the indeterminacy creates the
same possibility for selective and result-oriented application of
small-“c” constitutionalism as exists with the originalist theories
it is advanced to replace.
*****
Eskridge and Ferejohn conclude their book by offering a
gardening metaphor. In the “dominant discussion,” rights are
static, locked inside a document, made by others and for others
to apply. For the book’s authors, however, the fundamental
norms we live by are like plantings, alive and in need of tending.
Not everyone will embrace the imagery. It does, however,
suggest an axiom that aptly captures the message the authors
want to convey: Better to reap what you sow, than be told what
to grow. The Justices are unlikely to listen. But they are bit
players, after all, in the ongoing drama Eskridge and Ferejohn
describe. We the People occupy the lead roles. Maybe their
message will germinate.

15. 347 U.S. 483, 496 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public education
violates the Equal Protection Clause).

